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The two largest Bolivian group lending programs are directed by the 
Bolivian Agricultural Bank and by the National Community Development Service. 
Both rely heavily on USAID financing. The programs are described and the 
extent to which they do not experience the major advantages associated with 
group lending is examined. Major advantages are: (1) getting credit to poor, 
previously inaccessible small farmers; (2) lower borrower transaction costs; 
(3) lower lender transa~tion costs; (4) higher repayment rates; and (5) more 
extensive technical assistance. Sociological interpretations of why these 
advantages do not occur are proffered. Some are based on differences in 
cultural values and attitudes towards credit and formal credit institutions. 
They are illustrated by comparing indigenous informal credit markets with 
formal markets. Other interpretations focus on group characteristics and 
include: (1) group formation; (2) social cohesion; (3) leadership; and 
(4) size. It is concluded that formal credit systems need to be adapted 
to the prevalent social milieu of rural communities if small farmer group 
lending programs are to be successful. 
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A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF GROUP LENDING IN BOLIVIA 
Introduction 
A determination by international donors that benefits from projects 
.... 
initiated in lesser developed countries were not reaching their poor 
majorities has resulted in a shift away from capital development and 
institution building programs. The belief that fruits from these basic 
investments would "trickle down" to the poor was questioned and a priority 
has been given to programs that impact directly on the poor. This shift 
is evident in financial markets where attempts have been made to deliver 
agricultural credit to the rural poor. Public, and particularly private, 
lending institutions have traditionally shied away from this potential 
clientele group because they are considered to be high risk and because 
transaction costs per unit of money lent to them are greater. 
Several financial innovations emerged as attempts were made to 
provide financial services to the rural poor. One of these is group lending. 
Group loans are thought to have at least four advantages over individual 
loans: (1) lenders are able to reduce loan transaction costs by making one 
loan to a group rather than making many small individual loans; (2) joint 
liability implicit in group loans reduces loan default rates and collection 
costs for delinquent loans; (3) costs of providing technical assistance 
are reduced by working through groups rather than individuals; and 
(4) borrower transaction costs are reduced which makes formal loans and 
timely repayment of them more attractive to small borrowers (Adams and 
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Pablo, 1980). A fifth advantage is that: group loans give access to low 
interest money to small borrowers who may otherwise be unable to obtain it 
because of language, literacy and other barriers. 
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In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of major farmer group 
lending programs in Bolivia. In doing so, we focus on sociological aspects 
of group lending. The analysis is divided into tl1ree parts: (1) a descrip-
tion of the major group lending agencies; (2) a review of the major problems 
encountered in their group lendinR programst and (3) a discussion of 
sociological issues and research problems whose attention may help improve 
the programs. 
The Data 
Data on group lending programs were collectE:d in Bolivia during .Tune 
and July, 1979 by the principal author while he participated in a Rural 
Financial Sector Assessment. They were taken from intensive interviews 
with group loan recipients, officials of the Bolivian Agricultural Bank 
(BAB), officials and technical assistance agents of Integral Cooperatives 
that are sponsored by the National Community Development Service, and 
regional and national directors of these institutions. The interviews were 
recorded on cassette tapes. 
Data were collected in three regions of Bolivia found in Figure 1. 
Betanzos is a highland region located several hours from Potosi. Cochabamba 
is located in the valleys between the altiplano and the Eastern lowlands. 
Many small farmers in these regions speak Quechua, an indigenous language. 
Santa Cruz is located in the Eastern lowlands. Each region has distinct 
climatic and cultural features. 
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. Figure 1: Areas of Group Lending Survey in Poli via 
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Principal Bolivian Group Lendirt8 Programs 
(1) The BoU.vian Agricultural Bank - The BAB is the pril'lary formal 
lending institution in agriculture. It has made group loans under two 
different AID fi.nanc:lal credit programs. They are the Agricultural 
Refinancing Fund-2 Program and the Small Farmer Credit Program. Both are 
oriented to small farmer clientele. BAB increased its lending activity 
with small farmers during the 1970's. In 1970-71, 27 percent of its loans 
went to small farmers. They represented less than five percent of the total 
volume of money loaned. In 1977-78, 85 percent of its loans were made to 
small farmers. They represented 55 percent of the total volume of loans 
made. Of these loans, 27 percent were disbursed as group loans an<l 
represented approximately 31 percent of the total volume of credit given 
during that period (Ladman, et al., 1979: VI-4,5,6). 
Group loans were generally made to three to five farmers. Group 
1 
members had to sign a statement in which they agreed to joint liability 
for loan funds received by other members. The assumption underlying this 
procedure was that it would stimulate th.e members to pressure each other 
to repay their portion of the loan. The group selected one or two members 
to carry out the loan transaction with the appropriate BAB office. 
Administrative costs were lower because fewer persons were required to 
negotiate the loan. 
1Poder Notarial. 
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I (2) The Integral Cooperatives - There are presently three Integral 
Cooperatives in Bolivia. They were organized and are supervised by the 
National Connnunity Development Service. The Cooperatives provide services 
to small farmers. Support for the lending program came through the 
Revolving Credit Fund for the Development of Small Farmer Organizations 
(CROFOC) which was financed almost entirely by AID. 
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The Cooperatives are organized at two levels. At the central level, 
they are managed by paid professionals who arP assisted by administrative, 
credit and vigilance committees. These conmiittees consist of cooperative 
members. In the surrounding rural areas, members are aggregated into base 
groups. Several of them are based on nuclei of previous indigenous 
organizations. Each base group has a president, a secretary and several 
"substitutes". Loan proposals originate at the base group level and are 
submitted to the Cooperative's central office for approval. Base groups 
may aggregate over 100 farmers and represent several rural communities. 
Hence, identification of members with one another may be limited. Each base 
group is represented in the Cooperative's general assembly by three of its 
members. 
The National Connnunity Development Service maintains several employees 
who provide technical assistance to the members of the Cooperatives. In 
addition, the Cooperatives have hired several agents directly. Each 
Cooperative also has an advisor provided by the National Community Development 
Service. The advisor's job is to assist the manager organize and administer 
the Cooperative. Cooperatives are also advised by credit, technical 
assistance, and administration specialists, wl10 are located in La Paz. 
' 
Principal Problems Associated wi.th 
Group Lending to Small Farmers 
The following discussion will center on the five aforemelltioued 
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advantages that are <'ssociated with group lending. It will di~cus~ whether 
and to what extent they are attained and factors that inhibit t l1eil 
realization. 
(1) Providing Poorer Farmers with Access ~2__~:.ow IntereHt ·,oari~ - Field 
interviews indicated that many farmf' rs who receive.l loans thru1'.·~h f .:oups 
had never obtained leans in the formal credit market. Most of l1en1 spoke 
little or no Spanish and were illitt>rnte. They typify the poor:~st ,•f the 
poor and are likely to identify visits to a bank t~ request a l·ian with high 
"social transaction costs" (Miller, 1.979). 
(2) Reducing_.J:_oan Delinquency Rates - In general, repaymPnt rates were 
as high for group loans as they were for individual loans to small farmers, 
and better than for those made to larger farmers in the Eastern lowlands. 
However, there was ccnsiderable variation in repayment rates frcm r~glon to 
region by lending institution. The BAB encountered low delinquency rates 
in its group lending program in Betanzos, but high rates in Santa Cruz and 
Cochabamba. On the other hand, delinquency rates were lower fo1· the Integral 
Cooperative lending program in Cochabamba than for those in Betanzos and 
2 Santa Cruz. 
Several explanations were given by cooperative officials for these 
variations. First, t:hey cited variations in the cultural traits of populations 
in these different r1•gions, especially different or lentations towards collective 
activity. The Punatn region of Cochabamba was the seat of the 1952 revolution. 
2The group lending prograns in Betanzos and S:inta Cruz were new and 
most initial loans had not yet become due. Leaders of these coopt>ratives 
feared high delinquency rates based on initial poor rerayment performance. 
' 
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The small farmers either drove away or killed the large land holders at that 
time and received small individual parcels of land. Officials noted that the 
communal farming orientation prevailing prior to the Spanish conquest was 
destroyed along with most facets of the indigenous culture during the colonial 
era. Small farmers of this region own land, but are highly individualistic 
in running their farms. BAB encountered many problems in its group lending 
program and the local branch manager indicated that the Bank intended to 
abandon group lending. In contrast, the Betanzos region experienced less 
cultural hegemony during the colonial period, and the "ayllu" concept of 
communal effort is still very real. It is manifest in the collective 
cultivation of communal lands and in the practice of "ayni"--a sharing of 
favors between two or more farmers. 
Another explanation that was given for variations in repayment rates 
is the occurrence of unseasonal climatic variations. Farmers indicated that 
floods, droughts, frost and hail all have a bearing on agricultural yields. 
When crop failures occur, farmers are less likely to repay their loans if 
they are made "in-kind". The Integral Cooperatives have several lending 
programs in which they provide seed, fertilizers and other production inputs 
directly to the farmer. Because these are all related to crops, there are no 
cash receipts to repay loans when crop failure occurs. Most loans are 
refinanced for another period when this happens. When loans are made "in-
cash", farmers often repay the loan in spite of crop failures. This is 
because they normally invest loan monies in several activities, including the 
purchase of farm animals. Indeed, investments in animals are probably their 
best hedge against risk. As one small farmer in Eastern Bolivia mused after 
relating the loss of a rice crop due to flooding, "Next year I intend to invest 
in "ganado" (cattle) for they truly result in "ganado" (earnings) while crops 
often result in "perdido" (loss)." 
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Several other explanations for variations in delinquency rates emerged 
during the field work. One is the nature of the small farmer orientation 
towards the federal government. Many believe that the governmeut should 
provide for their basic necessities--a generalized patron so to speak. It may 
do so through distributing money and production inputs. The interviews 
indicated that small farmers tend to view the Integral Cooperatives as 
government organizations. Base groups, therefore, have a tendency to 
"defend" rather than ''represent" the interests of their members when 
interacting with CoopPrative officiaLs. This implies, among other things, 
obtaining "give away" money from the Integral Cooperative. Many farmers 
do not believe that the Cooperative is their organization or that their own 
deposits are loaned back to them. 
' 
Yet another partial explanation for loan delinquency is the lRck of 
social cohension that exists within groups. Many groups are impromptu 
organizations that were formed for the sole purpose of obtaining credit. 
The lack of cohesion is perhaps best illustrated by the formal imposition 
of joint liability in the BAB group lending program through the poder notarial 
requirement. Several factors may cause the lack of cohesion including the 
lack of effective group leadership; the large group size (many base groups 
in the Integral Cooperatives have over 100 members); the tendency to group 
individuals from several rural communities; and the lack of other group 
goods in addition to credit. Each factor implies that group members rarely 
interact with one another and have little in common in addition to the loans. 
The result is a limited sense of "group" or collective responsibility. 
Farmers indicated that group cohesion and social pressure for repayment of 
loans exists in the informal markC't, The pressure is due to prevailing 
behavioral norms that have evolved in the cnmmunJty. 
l • 
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A final explanation for default on group loans is the lack of 
technical assistance offered to the small farmer. Technical assistance is 
considered by many to be a necessary condition for the introduction of new 
technology into small farmer production systems. BAB supervises loans but 
does not provide any direct technical assistance. BAB has a general 
agreement with the National Extension Service to provide assistance but 
bank officials and farmers both agree that little if any is provided 
(Ladman, et al., 1979: VI-35). 
The situation is different for the Integral Cooperatives. Each has 
several extension agents working directly with its members. Several have 
received university agronomy degrees, and others are "agronomy experts" 
(peritos agronomos) who have received some post-high school training. 
Extension agents of the Integral Cooperatives are often distrusted 
by Cooperative members. One reason is that they assume multiple and often 
conflicting roles, including: (1) coordinator of outside technical 
assistance; (2) advocate of the Integral Cooperative; (3) make of loan 
applications; (4) collector of loans; (5) extension agent/educator 
responsible for teaching the proper use of new technologies, etc., and 
9 
(6) supervisor of base group meetings. Distrust is also attributed to the 
fact that small farmers feel that "agents and small farmers live in two 
different worlds." When agents live among the farmers they are more likely 
to obtain their trust and, consequently, to encourage payment of loans 
and the proper use of new production technologies. 
(3) Reducing Administrative Costs - Lender administrative costs 
have remained high because of loan payment delinquencies. The regional BAB 
branch in Punata opened files on individual borrowers and decided to collect 
loans individually even though disbursements were made to groups. 
' 
' 
The Integral Cooperatives have central offices that are used to 
disburse and collect loans. Some groups repay loans at these c•ffices. 
However, many members rarely visit them. It was originally planned that 
base group leaders would collect payments and deliver them to the central 
office, but frequently this did not occur. Many base groups are located 
at considerable distances from the central office. Hence, small farmers 
10 
are discouraged from making payments by travel requirements, while lenders 
assume costs associated with the collection of delinquent loans by extension 
agents. Frequently, it takes an entire day for an agent to travel to a base 
group area. 
In summary, loan disbursement costs are reduced, but loan collection 
costs are as great if not greater than those associated with individual 
loans. 
(4) Reducing Borrower Transaction Costs - Borrower transaction costs 
are supposedly reduced because only one person is required to negotiate the 
loan at the Bank or Integral Cooperative an~ because group loans reduce the 
documentation required on the part of the small farmers. Have these costs 
been reduced? 
For Integral Cooperatives, loan plans for base group members are 
prepared at base group meetings with the assistance of an extension agent. 
The base group Auxiliary Administrative Committee recommends individuals 
for loans. The plan is then taken by the base group officers to the central 
office where loans are authorized after proper deliberation. Individual 
base group members then collect "in cash" or "in kind" at the central 
office and/or authorized distributors of production inputs. The criteria 
used by base group committees to evaluate member eligibLli ty for loans vary. 
' 
' 
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Requirements are minimal, and borrowers are required to visit the central 
office only once which further reduces their costs. 
For BAB loans, one or two group members are selected as representatives 
to carry out the loan transactions. This supposedly reduces borrower 
transaction costs. Each member receives part of the loan to carry out 
preplanned activities. Little cohesion is found in the groups as most 
were formed only to obtain credit. Perhaps because of it, many individual 
members have insisted on going to a BAB off ice to receive disbursements 
and make payments. This is truer in the Cochabamba area than in the Betanzos 
area and is probably related to the individualistic/collective orientation 
differences that were previously mentioned, When farmers deal individually 
with BAB offices, transaction cost reductions are minimal. 
(S) Reducing Technical Assistance Costs - Because the BAB does not 
provide any technical assistance, the following disucssion will be limited 
to technical assistance program of the Integral Cooperatives. The 
assumption underlying this advantage is that agents contact more farmers 
by working with groups than with individuals. Agents normally attend the 
monthly base group meetings at which time they may discuss objectives of the 
Integral Cooperative, collect loan payments and/or demonstrate the application 
of production inputs. 
However, the effectiveness of their assistance may be questioned. In 
the Santa Cruz area, the Montero Integral Cooperative has an agent who lives 
among small farmer members and farms his own land. Cooperative members 
indicated that this agent is particularly effective in transmitting new 
12 
technologies. He uses them on his own farm, thus providing a field 
demonstration. He also regularly visits members and discusses new practices 
with them. This individualized contact proves to be more "effective" than 
group contact. 
On balance, group lending programs in rural Bolivia have produced 
several of the hypothesized advantages. Perhaps the most important is that 
very poor farmers, who never used formal credit because of their unfamiliarity 
with Spanish, limited interaction with modern institutions, and illiteracy, 
were able to obtain it. 
Sociological Insights 
In this section we will discuss sociological explanations for why 
' 
group lending has not yielded increased repayment rates, reduced transaction 
costs and better technical assistance. The presentation will be divided into 
macro and micro levels of analysis. 
At The Macro Level 
A sociological appraisal of group lending, in Third World countries, 
must account for the social function of the elements in" the existing social 
structure. The role of credit, for instance, may be defined differently 
by the small farmer, the lender and the government official. Two alternative 
definitions are "welfare mechanism" and "generator of increased productivity". 
One definition emphasizes distribution of wealth while the other emphasizes 
efficiency of credit use. The small farmer is likely to be more concerned 
about distribution, especially when he does not have an economically viable 
unit. If he receives credit, he is less likely to make a profit and 
therefore to be able to repay a loan. If emphasis is placed on efficiency 
of credit use, it will probably not reach him (Gonzalez-Vega, 1972). 
' 
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The small farmer, the lender and the government official perceive the 
role of credit differently. The government official is likely to emphasize 
agricultural development in general and assume that subsistence agriculture 
will transform itself into commercial agriculture as traditional informal 
sources of credit are replaced by formal sources (Dantwala, 1966). In 
reality this transformation will require more than credit for small farmers, 
including adequate production inputs, storage facilities, a stable and 
equitable marketing system and technical assistance. Were the Integral 
Cooperatives to provide these inputs in addition to credit, their group 
lending program would probably be more successful. The lender is likely 
to emphasize efficiency of credit use. However, his autonomy may be 
restricted by the government. Government institutions may induce the 
lending agency to stress the welfare function. Often, it is asked to 
function as a welfare institution, yet is not granted a subsidy (Royden, 
i972).3 These unclear and at times inconsistent expectations by govern-
ment institutions and lending agencies undermine its stability and may 
create justifiable distrust on the part of small farmer borrowers. Small 
farmers may not repay their loans because they are skeptical about the 
economic viability of the institution. 
Attitudes of small farmers toward credit sources will also affect 
group lending success. Royden (1972: 25) notes that unstable political 
systems, such as in Bolivia, often lead to projects and programs that lack 
essential components. Small farmers experience contradictions, unkept 
promises and frequent changes all of which reinforce their distrust of 
of government programs and help explain their weak cooperation. Traditional 
3credit project success is normally defined in terms of financial 
performance; i.e., credit delivery and loan recovery. Little attention 
is given to impact on production of income distribution (Adams and Kato, 
1978). 
' 
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antagonism toward government, defined on the one hand as paternalistic 
and on the other as exploitive, also affects repayment. Attitudes towards 
government sponsored cooperative credit programs in Sri Lanka parallel 
those found in Bolivia (Ganewatta, 1974). Small farmers in Sri Lanka 
considered cooperative loans to be a government dole. They feel no moral 
obligation to repay for several reasons. First, small farmers perceived 
the government to be a wealthy patriarch who would not miss the loan if it 
were not repaid. Second, group members agreed not to repay. Social 
cohesion reinforced nonpayment rather than payment. Finally, the farmers 
reacted differently to an institution and bureaucrats than they did to 
local moneylenders who were members of the community. 
A comparison of small farmers perceptions of characteristics of credit 
from formal lending institutions and indigenous informal sources yields 
additional insights. In discussing credit and risk, Adams and Kato (1978) 
point out that informal credit is more helpful to the small farmer in times 
of urgent need because informal loans are more flexible. Informal loans 
may be made and repaid in kind, may be for consumption and are made 
immediately. Farmers are apt to repay to maintain good credit ratings with 
this valuable source. Informal loans are made to individuals while group 
loans are invariably made by formal lenders. 
The Sri Lanka study (Ganewatta, 1974) suggests several additional 
reasons for higher repayment in the informal market. First, the money-
lender is a member of the same community and generally is in continuous 
social contact with the borrower. Thus, norms about appropriate behavior 
apply and payment is a matter of personal honor. Second, these same norms 
may dictate that those who fail to repay Are socially ostracized. 
_, 
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Cash and land are highly valued by small farmers (Alers-Montalvo, 
1960) which may help to explain their preference for loans in the informal 
market. Small Peruvian farmers prefer not to join a cooperative credit 
association that requires that they use their land as collateral because 
they fear losing it. Thus, small farmers may be less favorable to group 
loans because they fear loss of their land rather than because of negative 
attitudes towards collective activity. This may explain the apparent 
individualism of small farmers in the Cochabamba region and the preference 
of farmers who received group loans from the Bolivian Agricultural Bank 
to assume liability only for their portion of the loans. 
The effectiveness of technical assistance is partly determined by 
perceptions of small farmers. Related to these attitudes is the extent 
to which technical assistance is essential to credit success. A substantial 
body of literature argues that it is essential (Tinnermeyer, 1972) and is 
based on the assumption that small farmers will adopt properly demonstrated 
innovations (Andrews, 1961). This may not occur. Crop inputs do not yield 
returns until harvest, and unfavorable climatic conditions may result in 
crop failures. Aversion to risk may inhibit adoption (Royden, 1972: 62). 
Thus, groups may facilitate technical assistance, but small farmers may 
refuse the assistance for reasons other than distrust of the agent. 
In sum, there are basic differences between formal and informal systems 
of credit delivery for small farmers (Gillette and Uphoff, 1973: 53). 
Formal systems promote economic growth by integrating farmers into the 
national economy. Informal systems are traditional, adapted to local condi-
tions and provide reasonable income. Small farmers view the formal systems 
as alien and as failing to provide benefits. The prefer to rely on 
established local informal lenders or rotating credit associations 
(Geertz, 1962). 
' 
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Rotating credit associations also fulfill noncredit functions such as 
education, sociability, recreation and the granting of prestige (Norvell 
and Werley, 1969; Bouman and Harteveld, 1976). Systematic study of these 
associations and their role in groups with strong ethnic ties may provide 
useful information on how formal group lending programs can be best 
appraised. Sanctions against default of payments include gossip, ostracism 
and, in some cases, violence (Kurtz, 1973: 52). Thus, repayment of credit 
by members of associations leads to personal security and self-approval 
as well as economic well-being. 
Group solidarity, therefore, is important to assure low delinquency 
in group loans. Regions of Bolivia where traditional forms of communal 
activity predominated--such as the ayllu in Betanzos--have had more success 
with group loans, especially for the groups representing existing collective 
organizations that have survived "economic rationality" (see Godelier, 1972). 
An assessment of group lending must include more than cost/benefit analyses. 
It should study the nature and characteristics of groups as elements of 
indigenous social structures as they are historically inserted in the global 
national economic system. 
At The Micro Level 
Literature on group lending in other countries highlights several 
factors that affect repayment and other success indicators. Factors include 
how the group is formed, the degree of social cohesion among its members, 
its size, and its leadership quality. 
Groups formed mainly for the purpose of securing a loan do not persist. 
Groups, however, that exist prior to soliciting a loan and for other purposes, 
tend to have lower delinquency rates (Adams and Pablo, 1980: 15). In some 
cases, groups are formed by the lending institution. However, their 
• 
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organization, supervision, and required technical assistance make them costly. 
Extemdon agents of the Integral Cooperatives are still spending comdderable 
time with base groups explaining the goals of the Cooperatives and the duties 
of their members. 
Cohesiveness is affected by seve;al factors. Pablo (1979: 10) found 
that groups formed by individual~ residing for an extended period in the 
same community tend to have n l·.etter loan repayment record than those composed 
of recent immigrants. The success of the Integral Cooperative in Sa11ta Cn:z 
may be in jeopardy because most of its members are recent highland migrants 
to that region. Criteria used to determine group eligibility and to choose 
group leaders are also important det~rminants of degree of cohesiveness. 
Ideally, membership and leadership status are based on mutual trust. 
·Ideally, too, the criteria used to determine group eligibility and leadership 
are determined by the group. 
Leadership that represents the ~nterests of group members and that is 
sensitive to members' needs is likely to hold the group together. Borrowing 
groups of small farmers in less developed countries often exist in political 
systems with accenuated patron-client relationships. This is true of many 
parts of rural Bolivia. These political systems may facilitate or inhibit 
the operation of credi.t programs. When village leadership is centralized, 
loan delinquencies are easily monitored and controlled (Gilett~ and Uphoff, 
1973: 55). Local elite however can use credit as a political instrument by 
giving credit only to their supporters. Ladman and Tinnermeir (1979) ar~ue 
this to be the case in Bolivia. Doherty and Jodha (1977) report a similar 
use of credit by community elite in India. 
• 
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The ideal size of groups is determined by the level of cohesiveness 
among its members. Small size intensifies interpersonal contact, but also 
increases the likelihood of major disagreements, unless there is strong 
leadership to impose cohesion. The lack of strong leadership in groups 
funded by the Bolivian Agricultural Bank in Cochabamba may explain their 
demise. On the other hand, the larger the group, the more difficult it is 
to maintain a conunon interest. Base groups of the Integral Cooperatives 
commonly number over 100 members and require considerable attention to 
group maintenance. It is difficult, if not impossible, for large numbers 
of farmers to hold similar interests beyond that of obtaining credit. 
Summary 
Group lending in Bolivia has not produced all of the advantages 
claimed for it. This problem was researched for the two major group lending 
programs. Possible sociological explanations for their nonattainment are 
analyzed at the macro and micro levels. At the macro level there are 
factors which affect prevailing values and attitudes in the ongoing 
structure; accounting for differences in the perception of the role of 
credit by borrowers, lenders and government funding sources; attitudes 
of borrowers toward formal lenders, loan requirements and technical 
assistance. They were illustrated by comparing informal and formal 
lending. At the micro level, group formation, level of social cohesion 
among group members, group size and the effectiveness of group leadership, 
are discussed. 
Using groups to extend credit to the rural poor in Third World countries 
is promising. Less concern, however, should be given to economic cost/ 
benefit analyses. Informal relations, at the socio-cultural level are 
~--
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instrumental in determining the degree of loan repayment rates. More 
research is needed on the nature and characteristics of existing informal 
groups, the concrete historical conditions in which they are inserted, and 
potential bridges between informal groups and lending agencies. 
' 
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